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locate financially responsible parties and ensure that all causes of
action are asserted directly against them. In addition, settlements
accompanied by releases of liability should only be entered into in
full knowledge of the financial strength of the remaining parties."'
The Klinger decision indicates that the Court of Appeals will require strict adherence to the statutory mechanism for obtaining
contribution. If properly used, New York procedural law provides
the means to ensure that those responsible for the injury to the
plaintiff are liable directly to him on the judgment.85
CPLR 1402: Defense of laches may be interposed in separateaction
for Dole contribution.
Actions for indemnity in New York traditionally have been analogized to claim in quasi-contract and hence governed by the 6year contract statute of limitations.8 6 With the advent of a right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, it was widely assumed that the
6-year limitation period would control these actions as well.87 Recently, however, in the case of Blum v. Good Humor Corp.,8 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, qualified this 6-year time
limitation by holding that laches may be interposed as a defense in
an action for contribution among joint tortfeasors 9
contribution "upon ... paying the full amount of the judgment rendered against him," 49
App. Div. 2d 693, 693, 370 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761, prior authority had indicated that defendant
need only pay an amount in excess of his Dole share to be eligible for contribution. See Adams
v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 826-27, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974);
CPLR 3019, commentary at 276-79 (McKinney 1974); 2A WK&M
1402.01. The Klinger
Court agreed with the latter interpretation. 41 N.Y.2d at 372, 361 N.E.2d at 981, 393 N.Y.S.2d
at 330. Therefore, under Klinger, a defendant who has paid only an amount equal to his
equitable share is not entitled to contribution.
"1 General Obligations Law § 15-108 provides that a release given by a plaintiff to one of
several tortfeasors does not release the other tortfeasors from liability. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 15-108 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). The amount that may be obtained from the unreleased tortfeasors, however, may exceed neither their Dole shares nor the amount of the
judgment as reduced by the consideration received by the plaintiff for the release. Id.; see
id., commentary at 139-40.
See note 65 supra.
A cause of action for indemnity is predicated upon a contract implied in law; the 6year contract statute of limitations, which also governs suits in quasi-contract, therefore has
been held applicable. See Moran Transp. Corp. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 126 F. Supp. 122, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y. 284, 294, 34 N.E.2d 322, 327 (1941); Smith
v. Smucker, 198 Misc. 944, 947-48, 100 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38-39 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1950);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Societe Coiffure, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41-42 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1944).
" See Occhialino, Contribution,NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 217, 230
(1974).
57 App. Div. 2d 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d Dep't 1977).
" Id. at 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
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An action originally had been instituted against Blum for personal injuries sustained by a 2 1/2-year-old child. The infant had
darted out from between a parked automobile and an ice cream
truck allegedly belonging to Good Humor, at which point he was
struck by a car owned and operated by Blum. Although the accident
occurred on July 12, 1970, the case was not settled until early 1974.11
Thirteen months later, on March 2, 1975, Blum brought the instant
action against Good Humor for contribution." In its answer, the
defendant Good Humor raised the equitable defense of laches,
claiming not only that nearly 5 years had elapsed since the accident,
but also that the operator of the truck had never been identified,
the police accident report had not mentioned Good Humor's vehicle, and Good Humor itself had never been notified of the accident.2
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied plaintiff Blum's motion to strike the defense of laches from defendant's answer.9 3
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the
order of the supreme court. 4 Justice Martuscello, writing for a divided panel, reasoned that since an action for contribution is equitable in nature,95 any "gross injustice" occasioned by the 13-month
delay could be considered by the court.99 The second department
1 Id. at 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
It Id., 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896. It should be noted that the general right of a joint tortfeasor
to obtain contribution was not established until almost 2 years after the Blum accident. See
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y. 2d 143, 148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387
(1972). In fact, the question whether the doctrine of contribution applied to actions pending
on the date Dole was decided was not resolved affirmatively until a few months after Dole
when the decision in Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 764, 284 N.E.2d 579, 333
N.Y.S.2d 425 (1972) (mem.), was announced. See CPLR 3019, commentary at 302 (McKinney
1974). Accordingly, Blum did not have a substantive right to implead Good Humor into the
original suit.
12 57 App. Div. 2d at 911-12, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896. For a defense of laches to succeed,
both a delay and resulting prejudice must be demonstrated. Sorrentino v. Mierzwa, 25 N.Y.2d
59, 63, 250 N.E.2d 58, 60, 302 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568-69 (1969); CPLR 3019, commentary at 261
(McKinney 1974); H. PETERFREUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE 125 (3d ed. 1973);
1 WK&M 213.07.
1357 App. Div. 2d at 911, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The supreme court granted Blum's motion
to strike defendant's statute of limitations defense, since the action had been brought within
the prescribed 6-year period. Id. The second department affirmed. Id.

Id.
I
Id. at 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896. The doctrine of contribution, which represents an
attempt to distribute equally the burdens of an obligation, is of equitable origin. 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTs § 345, at 765 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959). Until recent times,
however, this action generally was restricted to liability based on contractual obligations, see
id., and did not encompass tortious liability, see Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(K.B. 1799); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
1157 App. Div. 2d at 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896. Although the Blum majority never fully
defined laches, characterizing it only as "undue delay," it is well established that laches is
'
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therefore concluded that the defense of laches was not insufficient
as a matter of law and might be raised at trial.97 In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Cohalan argued that an action for contribution,
regardless of its equitable origins, is still essentially an action at law
to determine the relative negligence of tortfeasors and hence is controlled only by the statute of limitations.9" Noting that an action for
contribution accrues upon payment of the judgment by defendant
to plaintiff,99 the dissent suggested that the applicable 6-year statute of limitations had not yet run.' °° Furthermore, even if laches
were to apply, Justice Cohalan was unable to find any prejudice to
the position of the defendant attributable to plaintiff's 13-month
delay in commencing the action for contribution."'
While the defense of laches is utilized to prevent prejudicial
delay in suits in equity, it is apparently available only when discretionary relief is sought." 2 Since a joint tortfeasor has a legal right
to contribution, 0 3 it is suggested that the Blum court erred by enter-

more than mere delay; it is delay coupled with prejudice to the defendant arising from the
delay. See note 92 supra.
57 App. Div. 2d at 912, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
Id. at 912-13, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98. (Cohalan, J., dissenting).
CPLR 3019, commentary at 290 (McKinney 1974); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §
309 (4th ed. 1971); 2A WK&M 1403.03; cf. Hofferberth v. Nash, 191 N.Y. 446, 450-51, 84
N.E. 400, 401 (1908) (action to charge property of unserved debtor accrues on payment of
original judgment); Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 125-26, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 595 (2d
Dep't 1964) ("action for indemnity . . . accrues . . .at the time of the payment of the
judgment"). See also Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the General
Municipal Law and Related Statutes, TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENcE 358,
378 n.105 (1976) (discussion of cases determining when an action for indemnity or contribution accrues against the state). The proposition that an action for contribution accrues upon
payment follows from the theory that the obligation to contribute arises out of an implied
contract to indemnify; a duty to indemnify does not mature until an actual loss is incurred.

See RESTATEMENT

OF RESTITUTION

§§ 76-77 (1937). In the interest of judicial economy, CPLR

1403 permits an action for contribution to be commenced prior to its accrual "by cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim" in the underlying suit.
1' 57 App Div. 2d at 913, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98 (Cohalan, J., dissenting). No more than
13 months had run on the limitation period, since only 13 months had elapsed between the
date of settlement and the date the action for contribution was instituted.
,' Id., 394 N.Y.S.2d at 898. (Cohalan, J., dissenting).
,° Feldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 123-25, 18 N.Y.S.2d 285,
287 (Ist Dep't 1940); H. PETERFREUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE 125 (3d ed.
1973). For example, although an action for specific performance must be brought within the
statutorily mandated time period, since it is a discretionary remedy the court may find laches
a bar to granting such relief. See Groesbeck v. Morgan, 206 N.Y. 385, 99 N.E. 1046 (1912).
10 New York seems to afford joint tortfeasors a substantive right to contribution. See

CPLR 3019, commentary at 236 (McKinney 1974). See also UNIFORM

CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT § 3(d). This right is enunciated in both Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d

143, 148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972), and CPLR 1401, which
provides in pertinent part: "[Two or more persons who are subject to liability . . . for the
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taining a laches defense. This ruling, if followed, would reduce contribution from the right established by Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. "4
and CPLR 140115 to an equitable remedy available only in the discretion of the court." 6 Beyond this criticism, it is submitted that the
Blum decision reflects a dissatisfaction with the 6-year limitation
period in contribution actions. This 6-year period seems excessive
and may conflict with the concept of judicial economy as well as the
1 In this
policy against piecemeal litigation. 07
regard, it has been
urged that a 1-year statute of limitations for contribution actions
would best comport with all relevant policy considerations.18 Desame. . . injury. . . may claim contribution." In short, the availability of contribution does
not appear to be left to the discretion of any tribunal.
It is submitted that equitable considerations are relevant in determining whether a claim
for contribution should be tried separately from the main action. This appeared rather clearly
in the wording of Dole which stressed: "Whether the causes are tried together or separately
would rest in the court's discretion, according to the requirements of fairness." 30 N.Y.2d at
153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391. See CPLR 3019, commentary at 261-62 (McKinney 1974).
10430 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 286 (1972). See CPLR
3019, commentary at 236 (McKinney 1974); 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 815, 820-21 (1972).
105CPLR 1401, quoted in note 103 supra.
11 By applying the equitable defense of laches, a court in its discretion may bar an action
although the suit was within the period set by the statute of limitations. See note 102 supra.
'I7See Occhialino, Contribution,NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 217, 23233 (1974). The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act employs a unique approach in
this area:
If there is no judgment . . . against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right
of contribution is barred unless he has either (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right
of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one
year after payment, or (2) agreed while action is pending against him to discharge
the common liability and has within one year after the agreement paid the liability
and commenced his action for contribution.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 3(d). Alternatively, if there is a judgment
against the tortfeasor, his right to contribution is barred "after the judgment has become final
by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review." Id. § 3(c). See id., comment to subsections (c)& (d).
The emergence of a 6-year limitations period for contribution actions was rather fortuitous. As Professor Occhialino pointed out in his study, the unjust results which flowed from
the pre-Dole limitations on contribution among tortfeasors led to the development of a partial
remedy through the recognition of an indemnity doctrine. Occhialino, Contribution,
NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE 217, 231 (1974); 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 815, 815-18
(1972). In search of a theoretical underpinning for this limited right to contribution, the courts
turned to a quasi-contract theory with its accompanying 6-year statute of limitations. See
note 86 supra.
"I Professor Occhialino proposed a 1-year statute of limitations for contribution actions.
This shorter period effectively would result in trying most actions for contribution together
with the underlying suits. Occhialino, Contribution, NINETEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD.
CONFERENCE 217, 232-33 (1974); accord, UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT
§ 3(c). Professor Occhialino also argued that the cause of action for contribution should
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spite the questionable result reached, the decision in Blum may
have the salutory effect of focusing legislative attention upon this
area. As a consequence, it is hoped legislative action significantly
reducing the statute of limitations for actions in contribution will
be forthcoming.
ARTICLE

41

-

TRIAL BY A JURY

CPLR 4102(a): Party requesting nonjury trial may not later object
to withdrawal of another party's demand for jury trial.
CPLR 4102(a) requires a party who desires a jury trial to include a demand in a note of issue served on all parties and filed with
the court.' Failure to include the demand is deemed a waiver of the
right to a jury trial."" To withdraw a demand under 4102(a), a party
must obtain the consent of the other parties to the action.", Recently, in Gonzalez v. Concourse Plaza Syndicates, Inc., "I the Court
of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, held that a party who indicates
his preference for a nonjury trial in a note of issue thereby consents
3
to any subsequent withdrawal of demand for a jury trial."
The Gonzalez plaintiff commenced a wrongful death action
after her husband fell from a window he was washing at the Concourse Plaza Hotel, naming the hotel and the Weinbergs, occupants
of the apartment whose windows the decedent was washing, as defendants. Plaintiff filed a note of issue requesting a trial without a
accrue at the time the tortfeasor is served with process and is able to obtain jurisdiction over
the third-parties. Id. at 230-32.
"' CPLR 4102(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue of fact triable of right by a jury,
by serving upon all other parties and filing a note of issue containing a demand for
trial by jury. Any party served with a note of issue not containing such a demand
may demand a trial by jury by serving upon each party a demand for a trial by
jury and filing such demand . . . within fifteen days after service of the note of
issue.
For a general discussion of CPLR 4102, see 4 WK&M
4102.01-.22.
11" CPLR 4102(a). Although the right to trial by jury is protected by the state constitution, "a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed
by law." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. The Court of Appeals has held that the right to a jury trial
must be timely asserted. See Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 6 N.Y.2d 435, 442, 160 N.E.2d
826, 829, 190 N.Y.S.2d 337, 342 (1959). See generally Craig v. City of New York, 228 App.
Div. 275, 239 N.Y.S. 328 (1st Dep't 1930); 4 WK&M T 4102.10.
" CPLR 4102(a). See Russell v. Russell, 40 App. Div. 2d 945, 339 N.Y.S.2d 319 (4th
Dep't 1972) (mem.); Schrank v. Rensselaer Assocs., 65 Misc. 2d 428, 317 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup.
Ct. Rensselaer County 1970) (mem.).
12 41 N.Y.2d 414, 361 N.E.2d 1011, 393 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1977) (per curiam), aff'g 51 App.
Div. 2d 42, 378 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1976).
1" 41 N.Y.2d at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363.

